BOOK REVIEWS
Conklin and Siegan agree that incompetence and selfinterestedness among legislators, when combined with defects in legislative processes, pose significant threats to the rights of individuals. Writing in the common law tradition, Conklin and Siegan find judicial scrutiny of legislative action to be the only means of safeguarding these rights. This scrutiny must be a searching one and based on overarching and abstract criteria. Professor Conklin derives his criteria by asking of judges the hard "moral-political questions."
' Professor Siegan's historical inquiry into broad but vaguely-defined economic liberties' is informed by recent insights from the Chicago School of law and economics. Differences in approach lead the authors to find very different fundamental rights infringed in very different ways, but they do agree that judges have often proved themselves both unable and unwilling to protect these rights.
For Conklin, this judicial inability and unwillingness exists whether or not a judge looks back upon rights exercised in an idealized past (as did Chief Justice Coke), acts as vox populi, or defers in varying degrees to legislative policy judgments. Utilitarianism has little utility for the protection of rights as Conklin defines them, rights so beyond temporizing that the arguments [Vol.16
Conklin seeks to "pierce the veil" of constitutions and statutes to discover those arguments that ought to be adopted by advocates of fundamental (i.e., "essential," "formative," "irreducible") rights. ' The Supreme Court has, with a few exceptions, 9 rejected the notion of "fundamental" rights in favor of discussions of rights "incorporated" in the fourteenth amendment or occupying a "preferred position." Treating fundamental rights as a relatively novel concept is, indeed, an aid to understanding Conklin. His rights are only based in part on natural law, yet they "are held independently of statute, judicial decision, custom or even written constitution. They are held independently of one's utility to society."' Here we encounter a tension deep within Conklin's analysis. Firmly rooted in the common law tradition, his arguments nevertheless seem to ignore one of its central postulates: rights without remedies anchored somewhere in the law are no rights at all under a procedurally-oriented jurisprudence." Conklin's presumed response to this objection is that shortcomings in judicial argumentation and "the very nature" of our constitutions direct "us to leave the traditional legal materials" in our search for fundamental rights. 2 Common law lawyers have proved most reluctant to "leave the traditional legal materials," however, and why they should do so now remains unclear. The overall structure of Conklin's argument seems to require that the reader assume a priori the thing to be proved: the existence of (disembodied) fundamental rights.
Conklin's book admittedly does provide many incentives for those willing to stray from the case reports. One of its distinctive features is Conklin's painstaking yet broad-gauged comparative ap-8. W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 1-3. For a list of the rights Conklin deems fundamental, see text accompanying note 41 infra.
9. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106-07 (1908): A fundamental right -is such "that there could be no due process without it." (Twining does, of course, wind up as a case about "incorporation.") Conklin and Siegan do not pursue the incorporation and preferred position doctrines in conventional ways, and their analyses are none the worse-probably better-for it.
10. W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 219. 11. See note 3 supra. 12. W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 5. See, id. at 2, 5. A more refined formulation is id. at 182: Rights and interests are fundamental if there exists Thurgood Marshall's "indispensible nexus" between the right and "the moral-political norm of selfrespect." See text accompanying notes 41-42, 82-86 infra. This extrapolation from San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) shows more promise as a judicial (as distinct from a philosophical) doctrine, but the reader may doubt a judge's ability to manipulate the doctrine in ways which consistently protect fundamental rights (however defined). Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982] , Art. 6 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/6 BOOK REVIEW proach. Educated in Canada, England, and the United States, Conklin is at home in three legal and political systems, systems yielding profitable, yet relatively rare, comparisons. He demonstrates that, starting from different places and moving along different paths at different speeds, judges in the three countries have taken the quest for fundamental rights up the same blind alley. The Canadian experience with rights deserves to be much better known among American lawyers, both in its own right and because it points up defects and weaknesses in the protection of rights under the English tradition. Conklin's book should help to counteract the (perhaps "Rumpole of the Bailey") romanticism with which many American lawyers regard the English legal system, a tendency from which Professor Siegan is arguably not exempt. 13 Like Siegan and many others, Conklin begins his historical analysis with Chief Justice Coke. Coke is rightly praised for having "constitutionalised the principle of the 'rule of law,'" described specific rights, and asserted the lawyers' monopoly over finding and explicating these rights." What is less clear from Conklin's (and Siegan's)" analyses is that many of Coke's good works were based on a capitalization of occasional relaxations in the (often petty) despotism of kings, a capitalization so shaky as to be all but dismantled under the press of subsequent events and under the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688 in particular. Many of Coke's innovations were thus undone before (and by) the American Constitutional Convention." Conklin does, however, effectively criticize Coke's 13 . See text accompanying notes 53-58 infra & note 56 infra. Siegan Coke admits that he contradicts "Fortescue and Littleton and all others" in holding that the common law prevails over custom and statute. The common law and Coke's analyses based upon it were, of course, subordinated to the Constitution in the United States, see note 54 infra, although it is possible in theory to discern a constitutional common law which overrides statutes. However, given the broad powers that the Supreme Court reserves to itself to overrule precedents, this statement is not very meaningful. 192-93 (1977) . Gallup polls call into question the legitimacy of government, its powers and the Constitution itself. Further, it is difficult to prove that laws represent the will of the majority when only 36-46% of those eligible vote in elections. B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 267. If this is the vox populi, it is an exceedingly fragile and ever-shifting basis for any kind of rights. The most effective (but perhaps unintentional) refutation of the judge as vox populi comes from Holmes: "I heard the original Agassiz (Louis) say that in some parts of Germany there would be a revolution if you added a farthing to the cost of a glass of beer. If that was true, the current price was one of the rights of man at that place. on the opinions of an informed citizenry concerning rights, on "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Although we may like the Furman result (thereby assuring ourselves that we are "informed"), Justice Black's criticism of "shock the conscience" as a "nebulous" standard legitimating an "unlimited power'2 would seem to apply with even greater force to Marshall's test. Judges have much more leeway if they are to decide who is informed about what. The temptation would be to do more explicitly what Lord Devlin and many judges in tort cases do implicitly, to ascribe the judge's personal views to an abstracted segment of the citizenry such as the reasonable man.
Valparaiso University Law
Conklin emphasizes that the broad language of the United States Constitution empowers rather than restrains the judiciary. In comparison, Siegan would argue that cases like Carolene Products 23 pursue a self-restraint which amounts to judicial activism in that specific constitutional language is ignored. The deference shown to legislative socio-economic judgments under Carolene Products and its progeny comes close to the "legislative supremacy" doctrine of nonreviewability applied by contemporary courts in England and Canada. This is a clear implication from Conklin's book, one he could have teased out to great effect through comparative analyses since his criticisms of English and Canadian courts are broadly in agreement with the arguments of Siegan and other American neo-conservatives. For Conklin, legislative supremacy "is nothing less than judicial abdication of responsibility": "Whether an individual possesses a right depends entirely upon the beliefs of the legislative majority at any particular moment. . ..", Conklin has to strain to find any justification for the doctrine of legislative supremacy. He finds it based on the "conventional opin- ion" that equates democracy with the will of the majority. This leads a judge straight back to Lord Devlin's Clapham omnibus or to a Benthamite use of Gallup polls and letters to congressmen, unless the judge is willing to adopt Edmund Burke's view of legislation as a matter of reason and judgment rather than inclination. None of these alternatives is appealing, particularly after Conklin and Siegan rebut at great length the notion that an expert class is elected to Congress. 25 Unfortunately, utilitarianism proves no better a protector of fundamental rights than legislative supremacy. Conklin's analyses reveal Bruce Ackerman's "awful truth" that anything will be countenanced in the utilitarian's single-minded search for collective happiness . 16 Like Ackerman, Conklin consults John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Those who prefer to read about rather than to read these worthies will find able summaries of their main arguments in Conklin's book. While Conklin can certainly maintain that issues crystallize in Rawls' work "with unusual clarity," 27 it seems no less true that, like the stars, Rawls sheds little light because he is so high. If Masses and Brandeis' Whitney opinion do not propose rights sufficiently fundamental, we are up against a demanding standard indeed. Conklin derives the standard by replacing the ultimate democratic norm of utilitarianism, the main basis for rights in the weak sense (and for the kinds of law and economics analyses Siegan applies), 5 with the "principle of respect for persons." This principle has at its foundation another principle, J.S. Mills' "selfregarding conduct," a principle the Moral Majority and right-tolifers, for example, refuse to acknowledge in practice." Conklin . Much of law and economics is rule-utilitarian and assumes that judges reach an efficient result based on manipulations of language, without duplicating the efficiency analyses of economists. See Moore, supra note 3, at 164-65. English judges have adopted similar justifications for their "legislative supremacy" standard for the nonreviewability of legislation. They create a "mythology" of the "will of the majority," ignoring difficulties in quantifying and comparing the intensity of citizen feelings and in discerning and describing a consensus. W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 75.
Along with a few others, Richard Posner now claims to reject a utilitarian approach to law and economics. 36. W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 6, 126-29 (implementing a desire to prohibit immoralities admits a power we would regard as unjust if applied against ourselves in other circumstances). Mills' principle applies only when the individual's interest is "primary" and society's is "indirect," slippery standards conferring much judicial discretion. Where Mills' principle does not apply, we quickly return to a utilitarianism: "[T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982] , Art. 6 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/6 argues that Mills' "inner sphere of life," in which neither the state nor society may interfere, is fundamental to Anglo-American ideas concerning liberty." The "inner sphere," however, seems to find little support among judges. Consider the narrowness of recentlydiscovered rights to privacy and the requirement of a "state action" against this inner sphere before judicial intervention is even contemplated.
The principle of respect for persons is refined further through Conklin's evaluations of three philosophical conceptions of the self. First to be rejected is the "real" self who has subjective desires and is the proprietor of his own capacities, owing nothing to society. The grounds for rejecting this self are not altogether clear in the book.
38
Its rejection would outrage the law and economics cognoscenti because the "real" self is none other than their beloved economic man. While real judges sometimes decide real disputes by dealing with the parties as if they are something other than real people, it is not clear that this advances justice or fundamental rights.
Conklin's second "objective" self possesses a higher goodness discovered through reason rather than examination of the actual desires of individuals. This self is rejected because the content of its goodness is susceptible to manipulation by authoritarian leaders and, I would add, by the followers of Edmund Burke and by not-soauthoritarian judges. Only a third self, always in the process of growing and becoming in her own socio-economic context, serves as the basis for fundamental rights by maintaining the inviolability of Mills' inner sphere of life. No politician or judge can know the true nature of the self, and officials are thus unable to hem her in by forcing her to be true to her true nature. Conklin's humane criteria are to be welcomed as an elevation of discourse, but they should not blind us to the fact that the genuinely humane are, and probably always will be, in a minority. Applications of Conklin's third concept of the self give rise to other practical dif- 
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Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982 ficulties, too. He argues that, with this concept of self in view, drug addicts and potential suicides are to be left free to choose a course of action once they are adequately informed about choices and their consequences. It can be argued, to the contrary, that suicide or drug addiction destroys the essence of this concept of self, the opportunity to grow and become that is the foundation of our willingness to recognize fundamental rights according to Conklin.° At another point, he argues that:
Language rights do not flow from the principle of "respect for persons" with the same facility as do the rights to life, thought, political participation, speech, assembly, religion and due process .... But their importance ... arises from the fact that, in the Canadian circumstances, language rights are essential conditions for the effective exercise of those fundamental rights which are integrally entangled with "respect for persons."'" This is undoubtedly true, but Conklin's line of reasoning can be used to extend almost indefinitely a list of the "essential conditions" we might call emanations or penumbras. A liberal education, of high quality, can and has been thought essential to the effective exercise of rights, as has a political and economic equality of access to government, the media, and meaningful employment. 42 Conklin does not tell us when and where to stop when we encounter the inevitable conflicts between liberty and equality and between majority and minority rights effectively exercised. It is difficult to see how courts could legitimately extend constitutional principles or create new ones to achieve the results Conklin seeks. These would appear to require new constitutions for the United States and for Britain and Canada.
II.
Conklin concludes that "the only legitimate limit to the scope of a fundamental right is the existence and exercise of another funda- ' .. but only because he adopts definitions of fundamental rights very different from Conklin's. Siegan finds "conceptual" or "intellectual" rights-Conklin's fundamental rights-more than adequately protected under the United States Constitution. They are, indeed, protected at the expense of Siegan's "material liberties": "property interests" or "business interests." These are "liberties necessary to maintain the form of government that had been created. Thus, in the economic sphere, the Framers sought to perpetuate a system based on private property and private enterprise."
4 Persistent judicial misinterpretation has left us with an "anomalous situation"; certain rights not mentioned in the Constitution, such as privacies, travel, voting and equal access to the criminal appeals process, are fundamental while property rights explicit in the Constitution have a relatively low priority."
Even the most detailed of Siegan's descriptions of fundamental rights" remain extremely vague. He nowhere attempts to define the 43. W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 230. See note 44 infra. 44. "[Tlhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community against his will is to prevent harm to others." B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 154. The "civilized community" did not include blacks, women, etc. during substantial portions of the history of "classic liberalism," however. 
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referents of property ("material," "business") rights. As a land-use expert, Siegan ought to know that:
The property regime is a set of rules concerning what to do about property; it is not a set of rules concerning what should and should not be property. If the efficiency of property depends on the rules being applied to the right things, then without a new set of rules about which things, we can't say anything significant about property's efficiency in general. 48 The search for the correct constitutional rules to protect private property is Siegan's focus, and he assumes that efficiency follows automatically from applying these rules to all of the material desires of economic man 4 9 -the "real" self rejected by Conklin. This cannot be, however, since the liberal and the social conceptions of property overlap and operate side by side in all countries in response to the common conditions and needs of individual and group life in society.' What happens is that when "the legislature or courts think that an 3. Every restriction must be as precise and narrow as possible, to avoid imposing any unnecessary restraints on people.
4. The responsibility for safeguarding these liberties rests with the judiciary.
5. In cases challenging any diminution of these liberties, the state, not the aggrieved party, is obligated to prove that the statute is in accord with each of the foregoing rules. (1st ser., A. Guest, ed. 1961). This is a form of due process (e.g., the English "in accordance with law"), but not one which Siegan is prepared to recognize. See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 224; note 42 supra. All "the evidence indeed supports the view . . . that socialist societies recognize the 'liberal' notion of 'full' ownership, but limit the range of things that can be owned." Honor6, supra at 110. Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982] , Art. 6 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/6 BOOK REVIEW interest should be alienable and transmissible they will reify it and say that it can be owned, that it is property." 5 Siegan would have us believe that, based on English antecedents, this choice was made once and for all by the Framers and reinvigorated by the Court under a substantive due process early in the twentieth century.
Valparaiso University Law
Like that of Chief Justice Coke, Siegan's backward-looking jurisprudence of public law must rely extensively on interpretations of carefully-selected aspects of legal history. Unlike Coke, Siegan forgets that "there is no going back. Whatever else, for good or bad, we cannot go back to this earlier America. It no longer exists, except in isolated pockets here and there."" Coke and Blackstone are marshalled in support of the proposition that common law property notions were incorporated lock, stock and barrel into our Constitution.' Of course, common law courts are, in the nature of things, backward-looking, homologizing that which is and will be with that which has been. However, our link with the English courts was severed by a legal force majeure, the new start of 1787, except to the extent that we chose to re-establish links on our own terms. The English constitution of property had little to recommend it at the time, chiefly because it firmly contradicted our own. The early constitutional history of England and the foundation of the common law is that "the whole governmental system-financial, military, 54 Along with the law of treason, kings used property restrictions to attempt to bend the powerful to their will. This prerogative was gradually wrested from kings by Parliament (a process far from complete by the American Revolution, although feudalism was formally decreed at an end in 1660), but for purposes to be determined by Parliament and not by self-interested individuals. There is an historical continuity to this process which runs up to the present," the hopeful optimism of Coke and of Blackstone's attempt to privatize property laws notwithstanding.
Chancellor Kent understood this process, but some other American judges have allowed the romanticism of parliamentary democracy to get the better of them." The same thing happens to Siegan, who adopts Blackstone's description of property rights as "free use, enjoyment and disposal ... without any control or'diminution, save 
F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 23 (1948). See id. at

P. McAUSLAN, LAND, LAW AND PLANNING 43 (1975):
[From 1846 to 1890, English planning law and policy relating to land) had run the full range of options open to a society that was not going to take the final step of abolishing private enterprise and private land ownership completely. Indeed, since 1890 the only genuine innovations . . . have been in the area of whole or partial land or development value nationalisation ... as a possible solution to urban problems. On the historical continuity of this process, see id. at 34-36 (citing property regulations of 1388, 1589 and 1667). Partial "development value nationalisation" is accomplished (in a less centralized fashion) in the United States through a variety of devices, many of which are constitutional. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 35, passim.
56. E.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 115 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Cooley, J.): "Parliament . . . has the power to disregard fundamental principles and pass arbitrary and unjust enactments; but it cannot do this rightfully, and it has the power to do so simply because there is no written constitution .... This is nonsense. If the constitution, written or not, permits parliamentary arbitrariness, rights based on "fundamental principles" lack remedies and are thus no rights at all. Earlier (id. at 114) we are told that England's unwritten constitution rests on the "frequently declared privilege of Parliament and the people, to violate which in any material respect would produce a revolution in an hour." Violations of parliamentary privilege did occasionally give rise to "revolution," but violating the people's (as opposed to Parliament's) privileges resulted in rebellion (unsuccessful, constitutionally illegitimate revolution) at most. Even in democratic theory, Parliament and people must be treated as distinct entities until the franchise was broadened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite defects in Bradley's and Cooley's arguments, Siegan 59 While Siegan notes at one juncture that the Framers might have been a bit mercantilistic, he asserts that they rejected the granting of significant economic powers to the federal government in order "to perpetuate a system based on private property and private enterprise."
6 By a series of semantic shifts, the Framers, Justice Story and Chief Justice Marshall become diehard apostles of a laissez faire."
1 It is hard to-see how this can be so. First, the common law of eighteenth-century England and 57. B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 31. See id. at 80; note 13 supra. 58. B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 31 (Siegan's interpolations from Blackstone). A similar formulation was adopted by Chancellor Kent, see id. at 43-44. But see notes 16, 55-56 supra. Ownership has never been absolute, in the sense of exemption from social controls. Honord, supra note 50, at 144. The American position seems to be that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
[T]his is a question of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.). What is "too far" has changed over time and has gone much further than Blackstone's "gentle and moderate" regulation. 
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of America prior to the Civil War, as well as the "natural law criteria" Siegan finds embedded in that common law, are much more specific and limited than laissez faire doctrines. Second, The Wealth of Nations (1776) quickly caught the imagination of a few, but its impact on American and British law and politics can be traced back no further than 1800. Third, various levels of American government pursued mercantilistic policies all but free of constitutional constraint until levels of private capital were adequate to support a more private enterprise. This happened in about 1880, the beginning of an era during which the modern corporation, its transmutation into a "person" under the fourteenth amendment, and the doctrine of substantive due process emerged to grow together."
The substantive due process era, roughly 1890 to 1934, is often held to circumscribe the laissez faire thinking of the Court. But it can be more convincingly argued that the judicial attitudes of that era were not laissez faire but Victorian, allowing for the time it took these worthy ideas to cross the Atlantic and for modifications to suit American sensibilities. A laissez faire in liquor, lottery tickets, gambling, and sex never appealed much to American judges during the heyday of substantive due process doctrines. These doctrines It is grave error to suppose that the duty of the state stops with the establishment of those institutions which are necessary to the existence of government .... To aid, encourage, and stimulate commerce, domestic and foreign, is a duty of the sovereign as plain and as universally recognized as any other. See Dorfman, note 53 supra. This view would, however, seem highly eccentric only a few decades later, after big business "made a successful take-over bid for all the economic power that was worth having." A. SCHONFIELD, supra, at 304. See L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 122 (1948) . But see B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 20-22. Although the works of Friedman and Hurst are landmarks of legal history which emphasize the economic aspects of that history, Siegan makes no reference to them. He also assumes throughout that the motivations of corporations are wholly congruent with those of physical persons, an unwarranted assumption in the eyes of some economists.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982] , Art. 6 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/6 did not prevent occupational licensing or the creation of strong and solid middle-class groups of artisans, farmers, business and professional men. To the extent that judges paid any attention to economics, it was not to classical economics but to neoclassical theories (not yet fused with Keynesianism) reflecting the Victorian complacency of the new middle class and reifying all of property into the tangible things of private owners-attitudes intolerable to an Adam Smith. Social problems were covered in the comfortable blanket of a morality based on duty, self-restraint and self-help. Periodic fears of a "class war" notwithstanding, perceptions of prosperity and social stability made strong government seem neither necessary nor desirable. 3 To argue that these judicial attitudes were Victorian is not to deem them inappropriate for contemporary America, where a NeoVictorianism may be growing apace under its own moral majority and supply-side proposals for a gold standard. It does, however, suggest that the roots of substantive due process are much shallower and run to different sources than those found by Siegan.
Siegan's reinterpretation of history makes substantive due process into what we would today call a hallmark of judicial restraint and strict constructionism, thereby casting Carolene Products into the outer darkness of judicial activism by way of contrast.
4 This is quite a feat, but the better argument remains that the substantive due process Court, having developed a dangerous appetite for power, rewrote separation of powers doctrines while substituting its policy judgments for those of legislatures known, at the time, to be 64. E.g., B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 113-34, 138, 327. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932), Brandeis' dissent reflects the "characteristic" Depression-era distrust of competition. From this distrust develops the interventionist notions that (until recently at least) would form the basis for the regulation of trucking and airlines. In comparison, all that the Liebman majority did was to substitute its judgment for the Oklahoma legislature's while holding that the ice business was essentially private in nature. This was wise. Oklahoma's action could serve only to decrease competition in the ice business. The expense of providing ice was too great to require producers to serve the entire population and the price of ice would rise, resulting in a net loss to society. B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 135.
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[Vol.16 full of "populists," "progressives," and other undesirables. 5 This interpretation leaves Siegan unmoved. For example, in his own words: "The Lochner principle is suited to a society of limited government. By creating an additional hurdle . . . . its application screens the legislative processes and requires due consideration for the plight of losers in political struggles."" 6 Who are the losers and who the win-. ners is not always as obvious as Siegan suggests here and elsewhere, and no case makes this clearer than Lochner. Even at the risk of being accused of parading the horribles, I cannot resist the temptation to quote another Sieganism: "Today, . . .adverse reaction to the Adair and Coppage [pro-"yellow-dog" contract] decisions is understandable. But this attitude fails to perceive the wisdom of an earlier day concerning the sanctity of contractual arrangements." 7 These and other arguments are used to develop 67. B. SEIGAN, supra note 13, at 122. See id at 124. "Pitney's contention in Coppage that government has no legitimate interest in encouraging unions was far less controversial than contemporary generations might suppose. The Court believed that the labor market itself would operate to support the welfare of both workers and employers." This may be so, but the Kansas legislature believed otherwise. Siegan argues (id. at 124): "That Adair-Coppage kept workers from flocking to unions is most doubtful." In any event, many employees had opportunities for extra compensation when entering into non-union agreements with employers. Id See also id. at 171 (quoted in note 33 supra).
Siegan also quotes with approval (id at 56) In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110 (1885) (striking down prohibition on cigar manufacture in tenements). "Such governmental interferences disturb the normal adjustments of the social fabric, and usually derange the complicated machinery of industry and cause a score of ills while attempting the the position that substantive due process is "hardly novel" and is, indeed, very much in a utilitarian tradition with a contemporary vitality. For example, Siegan feels that Justice Douglas could have reached the Griswold result" on the basis that the relevant statute infringed a liberty of contract in the sale of contraceptives.
9 This misses the point that, contrary to the teachings in much of law and economics, not all rights in life can be commercialized. Why doesn't Siegan go further to argue that Roe v. Wade" 0 should be based on infringements of the doctors' liberty of contract to sell abortions?
The book is two-thirds over before Siegan makes what would be an impossible distinction for many: it is excessive regulation rather than a lack of protections for property owners that really worries him. Siegan's attribution of fairly detailed opinions about economic regulation to the Constitution's Framers, in the face of his admission that this process was ill-understood even in Brandeis' day, is less an interpretation of history than the result of an ink-blot test. Deregulation is currently a fashionable thesis of course and, like many other contemporary theorists, Siegan doubts the political willpower to deregulate. Liberals like their health and safety provisos, and conservatives "are strong proponents of zoning, environmental, and obscenity controls. 69. B. SEIGAN, supra note 13, at 17. See id. at 222: "Frequently the majority [on the contemprorary Court] insists that its judgement is distinguishable from substantive due process, and almost inevitably the dissenters cry that it is nothing less." Cf. Roberts, supra note 58, at 30 (Griswold a "fluke" in the history of expunging substantive due process).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . See B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 20; id. at 177 (quoted in note 46 supra). Cf. Bishop, note 59 supra: "Every argument for, say, the abortion cases is also an argument for the older cases and even for the opinion of Chief Justice Roger Taney, a pro-slavery man, in Dred Scott v. Sandford," (Taney and two other justices invoked substantive due process as one basis for Dred Scott. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 40.) 71. Id. at 287. See id. at 240, 241 ("The pattern of concern for property rights stops abruptly when regulation is involved"). The practical difficulties in assessing public dispute over what constitutes a harmful, as opposed to merely inconvenient, use of property, yet Siegan tries to pin almost all of the resulting confusion on the judicial "abdication" of deregulating functions that began with Carolene Products-with creating constitutional doctrine by footnote.
2 Each Court-watcher could presumably come up with a list of ridiculous decisions under the presumption of constitutionality, but lists would differ in length and in the cases cited, and they would tend to be shorter than lists of ridiculous substantive due process decisions.
With one omission, 73 Siegan's book is the longest possible list of real and imagined injuries under regulation. Dope pushers, however, an extensively regulated occupational group, are not on the list. The backward-looking deregulation by the judiciary that Siegan espouses operates to favor established power and privilege-including those with small privileges, Siegan's unrepresented economic minorities. As such, it should not be confused with a laissez faire. It smacks, rather, of Social Darwinism, an important postulate of substantive due process and of the Victorianism discussed above. 74 Perhaps the part of Siegan's book most useful to the general reader is his able summary of law and economics studies which seek to assess the costs of regulation in various industries.
5 These studies and the historical uses Siegan puts them to are vulnerable, however, to a growing body of criticism. At the broadest level, Arthur Okun, for example, asserts that: "Society refuses to turn itself into a giant vending machine. . . . The domain of rights is part of the checks and balances on the market designed to preserve values that are not denominated in dollars." 7 Jules Coleman more specifically laments the incompleteness of the economics theories on which Siegan's analyses are based: "[W]ealth maximization [roughly, utilitarianism in its contemporary law and economics guise] can tell us nothing of our rights and liberties, nor of our duties and responsibilities in the absence of a system of fixed, relative prices. Surely some things are right and others wrong, even in the absence of prices.''" Even so, the fact that the value of economic liberties is easier to quantify than that of their political counterparts means that law and economics analyses tend to a built-in preference for property rights. Analyses like Siegan's sacrifice subtlety without necessarily gaining certainty.
A still narrower criticism would deny that economic efficiency results in each instance from the blanket application of so broad a doctrine as substantive due process, especially where economic policy analyses are based on nothing more than Siegan's educated guesses." It is efficient to strike down a property regulation if, but 78. From 1840 to 1915, the purchasing power of wages trebled in America while working hours declined substantially. Because "relatively few welfare laws and unions existed in these decades, the betterment of life must be attributed to the success of the economic system." B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 125. This non sequitur lacks documentation, yet it is a basis for analyses of subsequent cases. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) was correctly decided: "To the extent that the wage exceeds the fair value of the services rendered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support of a partially indigent person, for whose situation the employer was not responsible." B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 144. The "fair only if, the demonstrable costs of the regulation exceed its demonstrable benefits, a state of affairs existing regardless of rights according to most law and economics experts." A definitive costbenefit analysis of what is judicial activism for Siegan must also be broader than his examination of property rights. It must set off all of the risks of judicial power against gains to society and to particular individuals ignored by Siegan, such as economic sustenance, equal educational opportunity, and freedom from discrimination and from unreasonable intrusions by the state.
III.
Siegan and Conklin agree that it is the ways officials justify (liberal) political values which set democracy apart from other forms of government, and that courts and legislatures in America (and in Canada and England for Conklin) have not articulated and justified these values satisfactorily. We may accept this critique and ask nonetheless: Why should rival preferences devised by, for example, value of the services rendered" is hardly a precise, operative concept in economics. Siegan presumably means fair value as determined by an unregulated (1840-1915) market, but this is a value-neutral determination only if-as was not the case-pure competition prevailed in the relevant labor market. Having made one value judgement, Siegan makes another; "the employer was not responsible" for the employee's "situation." He goes on to find Adkins wrongly overruled by West Coast Hotels v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937): "Laws that elevate the minimum wage above the market will cause employers to pay some workers more and to fire (or not to hire) others. By raising the required pay of workers whose productivity does not justify the increase, the laws create and maintain unemployment." B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 147. One value judgment is repeated here by Siegan and two others are added. "Productivity" is susceptible of precise measurement and is what justifies wage levels. While making this supply-side assertion, Siegan ignores the possibility that "workers" will produce something that they, and others similarly situated, cannot afford to consume. This possibility was painfully apparent to Lord Keynes and to the legislators and justices whose interaction led to 80. See Comment, supra note 74, at 747 n.221. Indeed, Siegan verges on an admission that the Framers struck a balance in favor of activism. "Given the sentiments and circumstances of their day, the Framers must have understood that unless they restrained it, the Supreme Court would exercise, to some degree, the power of judicial review over both federal and state legislation." B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 85. Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982] , Art. 6 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/6
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Harvard and Oxford philosophers or Chicago economists be adopted instead? Their preferences might be received fairly automatically as a part of contemporary legal culture by a continental judge, but their preferences lack a legitimacy ex officio under an AngloAmerican jurisprudence. Using somewhat simplistic separation of powers concepts, the dominant strand of our jurisprudence requires elected officials to devise laws and their underlying values, which are only 'then applied by persons who do not represent specific constituencies. There are also serious doubts whether a political community, such as Brandeis' ideal of ordered liberty, is even possible under contemporary law and economics or political philosophy. 81 Thus, Rawls, Dworkin and Posner make great headway among academics yet none at all among the vast majority of judges and legislators, those who have their own value preferences to pursue.
In contrast to the philosophers and economists who keep the traditions of liberalism alive, many judges and legislators have, until recently at least, placed a greater emphasis on equality. This concept does not even merit an entry in the index to Siegan's book, although constitutional history tends to throw liberty/equality conflicts into sharp focus. Conklin opines that policies favoring equality do not come into conflict with those securing liberty as often as is commonly supposed. Noting that the liberal tradition assumes political liberty compatible with significant socio-economic inequalities, Conklin updates this tradition by finding liberty to entail "a sufficient economic and social equality so as to permit each individual to exercise ...fundamental rights and freedoms effectively." 82 Difficulties emerge when Conklin begins to give examples of what amounts to a collapse of the concepts of liberty and equality around this notion of effective exercise. There can be no fair trial if the wealthy can retain better counsel, no effective exercise of rights among the poor in areas where wealth augments influence over public opinion and over candidates for office. Logical extensions of this list would quickly cause liberals to act on their anxieties, which stem from what Ackerman terms the "recurrent fear of a nightmare world where all human diversity has been destroyed in the name of an equality that levels everyone to the lowest common denominator." 8 3
That these fears can be capitalized to legitimate an inequality, rather than to treat it as an unfortunate fact of life, 4 is one of the reasons for the demise of substantive due process. To Siegan's regret, a balancing of liberty and equality has been put in place of substantive due process." The judicial technology of balancing finds few academic admirers,' giving rise as it does to, e.g., Dworkin's weak sense of rights. Balancing might nevertheless be approved under an economics-style theory of the second best, after more abstract and absolutist theories such as Siegan's and Conklin's evidence their unworkability in practice.
A major reason why these kinds of absolutist theories of 83. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 18. As a result, liberal philosophers are unable to explain the distinction between equalities they cherish and those they fear. ld. See W. CONKLIN, supra note 1, at 170. Cf. B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 189. (Legislators respond to that which organized wealth is skilled at providing-"campaign contributions, lobbying and expert testimony.") Siegan's conclusion is, however, that (as in Carolene Products) those marketing new or different products and services are denied equal protection of the laws unless courts protect these "economic minorities." Id. at 188-200. This is true at one level, but it neglects those economic minorities unable or unwilling to devote themselves to marketing. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
84. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (Pitney, J.): "[It is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights." This non sequitur is quoted with approval by Siegan, who notes that "reformers" would disapprove of it despite "serious questions ... about the desirability and effectiveness of laws intended to offset or ameliorate inequalities .. " B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 124. See note 67 supra.
85. Under this kind of balancing, the "protective barrier remained for conceptual ['intelluctual'] Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982] , Art. 6 http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/6 BOOK REVIEW judicial review are unworkable in practice is the linguistic limits to the specificity and precision of an abstract formula and of the judicial interpolations, extrapolations and hence policymaking that inevitably accompany the adoption of a particular formula. This may be more obvious when canons of judicial activism are considered, but it is no less true of extrapolations and interpolations from selfrestraint. To defer is to choose to accept policies made elsewhere, since the power to change them manifestly remains, for example, under the substantive due Orocess doctrines Siegan seeks to revive. Siegan suggests that many of these practical difficulties need not arise. "No policy-making or executive authority is granted to the judiciary. Consequently, the courts are [to be] left to exercise only those policy-making powers that are inherently related to the judicial function."" 7 But where is the court so bold as to admit to policymaking and to then add that its chosen policy is not "inherently related to the judicial function"-a concept with an almost unlimited elasticity in any event.
Instances of linguistic imprecision can also be found in Conklin's book. His principle of respect for persons, for example, presumes the existence of "'minimum floors' which must be fulfilled if we are to claim ... that our society is founded upon... fundamental rights." If this argument seems familiar, it may be because "minimum floors" sounds a lot like the recently much-discussed "safety nets." The nature and function of safety nets can be dimly perceived through the rhetoric, but only if one knows who is defining them. The same might be true of Conklin's minimum floors, a concept which arguably would attract an overly-politicized exegesis like a magnet.
87. B. SIEGAN, supra note 13, at 105. See id. at 105, 203, 304. But see Johnson, supra note 65, at 271. The "value-oriented approach justifies judicial power on the basis of the Court's commitment to fundamental human rights. The older, valuepassive mode legitimates the Court's power by denying its political, discretionary nature." Comment, supra note 74, at 747. Siegan's and Conklin's analyses shift back and forth uneasily between these approaches, which are mutually exclusive at many junctures. Further, the authors seemingly forget that, as a consequence of ambiguity, metaphor, vagueness, and open texture, "one cannot deduce any decision [including those in 'easy' cases] from any rule or principle on theories of meaning." Moore, supra note 3, at 221. Since a "judge must make up what he cannot discover ... he has no reason to exclude moral considerations from entering into this necessarily creative process." Id. at 281. Siegan and Conklin adopt positions similar to these at certain junctures, but much of the balance of their analyses serve to deny these positions. 
